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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
sion because in the ordinary case the defendant confers the requisite
jurisdiction on the court by appearing in the action. Bides v. Abraham
& Straus, Inc32 illustrates the outer limits of this point. In Bides defen-
dant moved successfully to dismiss the plaintiff's action on the ground
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. However, in its answer to a
cross-claim asserted by a codefendant, defendant failed to reallege its
jurisdictional objection. Hence, the curious result ensued whereby de-
fendant was deemed no longer a party to the action by the plaintiff but
very much a party to the defendant's cross-claim.
Will Einstoss lead to a judge-made limited appearance in the Ev-
eritt situation? An affirmative response is perhaps attributable to a
strong opposition to the Everitt outcome. Or, perhaps it reflects an ac-
quiescence in the observation that with the emergence of a minimum
contacts theory of jurisdiction the wholly fortuitous act of catching a
nonresident within the state should no longer serve as a jurisdictional
predicate. 73 Nevertheless, it is possible that in the future Einstoss will
be read conservatively and distinguished by focusing on the fact that
the administrator was not made a party to the Alaskan action. It is sub-
mitted, however, that it is an excellent time for, at least, restricting the
adversary's right to amend against unwary nonresidents to claims based
on the same occurrence or transaction that underlies the initial cause of
action.74
ARcLE 10-PARTiEs GENERALLY
CPLR 1005: Use of class action continues to be restricted by the courts.
In this age of consumerism, there has been an increased awareness
not only of the plight of the consumer but also of the availability of
many legal devices to aid in the effort to remedy that plight. One such
device is the class action prescribed in GPLR 1005.71 While advantages
to the plaintiff utilizing the class action include those of an economic
and procedural nature, imagine the profound impact upon public
opinion, the jury, and the opposing party when there exists a class of
1,000 plaintiffs suing for $500 each, instead of a single plaintiff prosecut-
72 33 App. Div. 2d 569, 305 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't 1969); see also Wajtman v. Brook-
lyn E. Dist. Terminal, 276 App. Div. 853, 93 N.Y.S.2d 586 (2d Dep't 1949).7 3 See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
74 Cf. Frumer & Graziano, Jurisdictional Dilemma of the Nonresident Defendant in
New York-A Proposed Solution, 19 FoRaHAmr L. REv. 125, 142-43 (1950).
75 For a comprehensive survey of the use of the class action in consumer suits, see
Starts, The Consumer Class Action -Part I: Considerations of Equity, 49 BosrON L. REv.
211 (1969); Starts, The Consumer Class Action -Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49
BOSTON L. REv. 407 (1969).
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ing his action in the conventional manner.76 Moreover, the class action,
if properly exploited, could foster a more economical deployment of
judicial manpower.77
Unfortunately, the class action in New York has been attended by
legislative inertia78 and judicial ambivalence. Mandating a require-
ment of both a common interest and common facts among all the
members of the class,79 the courts have largely limited actions to cases
involving "closely associated relationships growing out of trust, partner-
ship or joint venture, and ownership of corporate stock."80 Meanwhile,
other types of class actions have been dismissed on the theory that
"[s]eparate wrongs to separate persons, though committed by similar
means and even pursuant to a single plan, do not create a common or
general interest in those who are wronged.""'
In Hall v. Coburn Corporation of America82 the Court of Appeals
disallowed the attempt of a consumer to bring a class action which had
as its basis the similarity of the instruments utilized in creating the in-
dividual contract for each member of the class. The form contracts in
question were sales agreements for the purchase of carpeting, it being
alleged that the size of the print in certain clauses was unlawful.83
Defendant prepared the contracts and later purchased the executed
installment agreements from various retailers. Plaintiff suing on behalf
of herself "and all other persons who bought merchandise by entering
into retail installment contracts," sought to recover the credit service
charge under the contract.
Admitting that there is inconsistency in the cases, the Court none-
theless ruled that in any event "there must be more of a common
interest than the fact a number of persons made a number of quite
different and unrelated contracts with a number of different and
76 See Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BuFFALO
L. REv. 433, 435 (1960).
77 Id. at 438.
78 There has been little change in the New York concept of the class action since it
first appeared in the Field Code in 1848. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 1005, supp. commentary
at 62 (1970).
79 Id.
80 Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 402, 259 N.E.2d 720, 722, 311
N.Y.S.2d 281, 284 (1970), citing Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d
869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966); Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d
102 (1963); Case v. Indian Motorcycle Co., 300 N.Y. 513, 89 N.E.2d 246 (1949).
81 Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 292, 22 N.E.2d
374, 377 (1939). Compare Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d
287 (1938) with Onofrio v. Playboy Club, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 740, 205 N.E.2d 308, 257 N.Y.S.2d
171 (1965) (mem.) and Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256 N.Y.S.2d
584 (1965).
82 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
83 See N.Y. PERs. PROP. L. § 402 (McKinney 1962).
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unrelated sellers using the same written form."8' 4 In essence, the Court
did not believe that this was the proper time to enlarge the scope of the
class action in New York, primarily because many of the injustices
inherent in the sales contracts before it were perfectly legal. Given this
assumption, the need for a consumer class suit loses some of its apparent
urgency and the need for legislative relief becomes more obvious.
CPLR 1007: Case illustrates Mendel's effect on third-party claims.
It has been projected that one of the more unfortunate ramifica-
tions of Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.85 would be its impact on
third-party actions8 6 For example, if a retailer purchased an item in
June of 1968 and sold it in August of the same year, an action for
breach of warranty commenced by an injured plaintiff in July of 1972
would be timely.87 But, the retailer's impleader claim for breach of
warranty on the part of the manufacturer, accruing on the date of the
original purchase by the retailer, would be barred by the statute of
limitations. 8 A further illustration of the difficulty of dealing with
third-party claims is provided by Perez v. Chutick & Sudakoff.89
In Perez plaintiff was injured when a ladder on which he was work-
ing slipped. He commenced a negligence action against the general con-
tractor of the project on which he was employed and the subcontractor
in charge of installing the floors, Circle Floor Co. (Circle). Subsequently,
plaintiff sought leave to amend his complaint so as to assert a cause of
action for breach of warranty against Circle, alleging that the exces-
sively slippery nature of the floor caused his ladder to fall.
At this point, the court was faced with countervailing equities.
Undoubtedly, plaintiff's claim related back to the service of the initial
pleading since it arose out of the same occurrence set forth in the
complaint. 0 Yet, Circle did not manufacture the floor and, under
Mendel, the statute of limitations had already run on any breach of
warranty claim that Circle might attempt to interpose against the
manufacturer. This factor caused the court to deny plaintiff's motion
on the ground that the amendment would result in substantial pre-
judice to defendant.
84 26 N.Y.2d at 400, 259 NXE.2d at 721, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
85 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
86 Siegel, Procedure Catches Up -And Makes Trouble, 45 ST. JoHN'S L. Rv. 63, 69-70
(1970).
87 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964).
88 See C.K.S., Inc. v. Helen Borgenicht Sportwear, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 650, 253
N.Y.S.2d 56 (1st Dep't 1964); City & County Say. Bank v. M. Kramer & Son, 43 Misc. 2d
731, 252 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964).
89 50 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
90 Fa. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (1964).
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